The multi-billion market of army food has recently been shaken by several scandals related to product quality. Formally, the system for supplying products to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) involves control at almost every stage, but still, it seems that tens and hundreds of tons of substandard products are entering the army, especially its combat units. How is this possible?
Investigators from NGL.media discovered that cases of supplying substandard food to the AFU are far from isolated, and the existing control system appears to facilitate unscrupulous suppliers.
In early October, the media published an investigation about supplying nearly 11,000 cans of poor-quality canned pork from "Menterika" LLC to combat units. Following this, the Ministry of Defence enterprise "State Rear Operator" (SRO) terminated a contract worth over 2 billion UAH with the supplier company "Trade Granite Invest".
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defence was in no hurry to comment on the uncovered facts, so the journalists decided to analyze four more product deliveries to the same battalion, whose officer had previously complained about the inedible canned pork. The result was shocking! For a month, the battalion did not receive any normal cans with confirmed quality and the necessary documents, despite having a different supplier and manufacturer.
Journalists discovered that this is not an anomaly but a huge loophole in the army’s food supply system, allowing contractors, in collusion with manufacturers, to feed the army vast amounts of substandard food and pocket enormous profits.
Document Forgery
After the investigation was published, a special commission from the Ministry of Defence confiscated the remaining "Menterika" canned goods from the units they were delivered to and sent them for its own research. The experts from the Ministry of Defence laboratory confirmed the conclusion of an independent laboratory that these canned goods were substandard, and a service check revealed that the supplier "Trade Granite Invest" LLC used invalid documents to confirm quality.
These documents indicated that the quality of canned goods had been confirmed by one of the laboratories of the Food Safety and Veterinary Medicine Department (FSVMD), which is subordinate to the Central Quality Control Department of the Ministry of Defence. This laboratory indeed issued a positive conclusion for 19,000 cans, but later annulled it. However, the supplier company used the already annulled document to supply at least 38,100 cans.
How did this become possible?
The Food Safety Management must check every batch of any canned goods (meat, fish, and meat-vegetable) sent to the AFU. Specialists from FSVMD select samples for laboratory tests after an official request from the supplier company, which must include the batch volume, the supply agreement number, a list of units for delivery, and the manufacturer’s quality declaration.
If the FSVMD laboratory confirms the quality of the batch, it issues the supplier paper originals of the test protocol—the same number as there are units where it plans to supply these products. Representatives of the company show the original paper protocols to the heads of food services during the shipment of food. Reproducing test protocols is prohibited and considered a gross violation of the contract terms with the Ministry of Defence.
On January 18, 2024, "Trade Granite Invest" LLC requested the FSVMD to check a batch weighing 10,000 kg (10,001.26 kg, or 19,050 cans) of "Menterika" canned pork and received 71 copies of the test protocol in early February—corresponding to the number of military units. However, a few weeks later, the supplier requested the re-issuance of protocols for this batch only in eight copies.
As a result, in early March "Trade Granite Invest" received eight new protocols, and all previous protocols were annulled by the FSVMD. However, the company made copies of the annulled protocol and seemingly continued to supply non-verified canned goods to military units.
It is impossible to establish the exact volume of substandard canned food supply because, according to journalists, the Ministry of Defenсe conducted an internal investigation in only one of the military units that "Trade Granite Invest" supplied. However, even this check revealed that 38,100 cans of "Menterika" spiced pork were supplied under annulled protocols, for which the SRO paid over 4.8 million UAH. This is evidenced by three manufacturer quality declarations on batches of different volumes but under the same number (examples: one, two, three) that "Trade Granite Invest" representatives provided during the product delivery to this particular military unit.
Thus, besides the verification by the Ministry of Defenсe of the usage of annulled FSVMD protocols, there is probable forgery of quality declarations, essentially suggesting a collusion between the manufacturer and the supplier.
Follow the Shell Game Closely
The suspicion of collusion between "Trade Granite Invest" and "Menterika" to supply products bypassing the existing quality control system is confirmed by another telling fact. In January, "Trade Granite Invest" requested that the FSVMD check 80,000 cans of canned pork produced by "Menterika" in August of the previous year. At that time, FSVMD specialists found a lack of labeling on all cans and rejected the entire batch worth over 10 million UAH.
However, a few days later "Trade Granite Invest," as mentioned above, requested verification for a much smaller batch of the same cans, the quality of which the military laboratory confirmed and issued 71 original test protocols for supply to 71 AFU subdivisions. The supplier then asked the FSVMD to reissue this smaller batch for eight subdivisions, copying the already annulled 71 permits. Likely, this is how "Trade Granite Invest" managed to supply the previously rejected 80,000 cans of "Menterika" canned pork in the army.
It is important to emphasize that the supplier buys the product from the manufacturer only after receiving a positive conclusion from the FSVMD; thus, "Trade Granite Invest" could have reached out to another manufacturer. However, the company was seemingly very interested in supplying products specifically from "Menterika".
The companies "Trade Granite Invest" and "Menterika" did not respond to journalists’ requests for comment on this article.
How were "Trade Granite Invest" and "Menterika" punished?
The materials collected during the internal investigation were sent by the Ministry of Defenсe to the department of military counterintelligence at the SSU (a unit of the Central Management of the Security Service of Ukraine, which counters intelligence, terrorist, and other activities by foreign state special services, as well as organizations, groups, and individuals harmful to Ukraine’s state security). "State Rear Operator" has already banned "Trade Granite Invest" LLC from participating in tenders for 12 months and terminated the agreement worth over 2 billion UAH (specifically 2,023,875,000 UAH. At the time of the agreement termination, the supplier had fulfilled 51.5% of the agreement).
For "Menterika" LLC, the scandal with the supply of substandard canned goods had no consequences because the company did not sign direct agreements with the Ministry of Defenсe or SRO.
A Different Supplier, but the Same Problem
The supply of substandard products seems to be not isolated unfortunate incidents but a customary practice for army contractors. After the termination of the agreement with "Trade Granite Invest", the new supplier for combat units of the AFU in the Donetsk region became "Contract Prodrezerv 5" LLC. This company had already been supplying food there until the end of July this year when "Trade Granite Invest" replaced it. At the same time, "Contract Prodrezerv 5" also apparently supplied canned goods without proper checks and under invalid documents, as discovered by journalists.
Using the case of the same battalion mentioned in the previous investigation, journalists checked four weekly batches of canned pork supplied by "Contract Prodrezerv 5" LLC from June 21 to July 19. This supplier would bring canned goods of the brands "Classo Myaso" and "Garne Carne" produced by "Business Mit Product", but the soldiers complained about their quality every time.
Once, the battalion’s head of provisions simply refused to accept the substandard canned goods. "We rejected the batch of canned meat that they tried to push on us. We didn’t accept it," Dmytro Vlasenko, an officer in the battalion’s management, wrote to us then. "We didn’t write a claim because the supplier’s representative, not the subcontractor driver, must sign it."
The accompanying documents for these canned goods were not valid, and they were not verified by FSVMD specialists, confirmed the Ministry of Defenсe in response to a request from journalists. However, a week later, "Contract Prodrezerv 5" LLC still delivered the same canned goods to the military with the same invalid documents. "We accepted it because there was nothing else to feed the people with," explains Dmytro Vlasenko.
According to DEFENСE data, FSVMD specialists, upon the request of "Contract Prodrezerv 5", checked four batches of canned pork "Garne Carne" totaling 96,336 cans, of which 31,032 cans were deemed unfit for consumption. Judging by the persistence of "Contract Prodrezerv 5", it’s likely that these were the canned goods supplied to Vlasenko’s battalion.
Representatives of "Contract Prodrezerv 5" LLC and "Business Mit Product" LLC did not respond to journalists’ requests for comments on this article.
Unscrupulous supplies by "Contract Prodrezerv 5" LLC June 21, 2024 under the agreement No. 62/06-24-XII. "Canned pork" 1,140 cans, manufacture date March 29, 2024. Accompanying documents: quality declaration from LLC "Business Mit Product" No. 2808 for a batch of 3,000 cans; FSVMD test protocol from May 29, 2024 No. 122/461 for a batch of 26,256 cans according to the agreement No. 28/04-24-XII.The declaration and protocol were issued for different batches. The FSVMD test protocol was issued for a different batch. The batches according to the protocol and the consignment note relate to different state contracts.
July 5, 2024 "Canned pork" 572 cans, manufacture date January 30, 2024. Accompanying documents: two quality declarations from LLC "Business Mit Product" totaling 14,800 cans: No. 2941 for a batch of 4,800 cans and No. 3021 for a batch of 10,000 cans; FSVMD test protocol from June 19, 2024 No. 146/562 for a batch of 29,660 cans with the manufacturer’s quality declaration No. 2009.The declaration and protocol were issued for different batches. The FSVMD test protocol was issued for another batch. According to the Ministry of Defence, the batches of stew according to the manufacturer’s quality declarations No. 2941 and No. 3021 did not pass the FSVMD verification.
3. July 12, 2024 under contract No. 87/06-24-HP. “Canned pork” 572 cans, production date 30.01.2024. Accompanying documents:
quality declaration of LLC "Business Meat Product" No. 3021 for the batch of 10,000 cans; FSVMD test protocol dated 19.06.2024 No. 146/562 for the batch of 29,660 cans with the manufacturer’s quality declaration No. 2009, according to the state contract No. 62/06-24-XII.The declaration and protocol were issued for different batches. The FSVMD test protocol was issued for another batch. The batches according to the protocol and the delivery note are within different state contracts. According to the Ministry of Defence, the batch of stew with the manufacturer’s quality declaration No. 3021 did not pass the FSVMD verification.
July 19, 2024 under contract No. 87/06-24-HP. “Canned pork” 534 cans, production date 18.03.2024. Accompanying documents: quality declaration of LLC "Business Meat Product" No. 3091 for the batch of 5,800 cans; FSVMD test protocol dated 15.07.2024 No. 60/991 for a batch of 12,880 cans according to the contract No. 87/06-24-HP.The declaration and protocol were issued for different batches.
Error and ways to resolve it
Formally, the product supply and quality control system seems well-established and operational. Each link in this system fulfills its duties: the FSVMD checks batches of products offered by suppliers and prohibits the supply of poor-quality and hazardous products, the SRO collects orders from military units and pays suppliers only for the actually delivered goods, and the product officers on-site inspect them and obtain documents. How do large volumes of poor-quality and hazardous products seep through this controlled mechanism?
The only logical explanation journalists found is the lack of coordination between Ministry of Defence structures. The military laboratories of the FSVMD confirm the quality and safety of specific batches and indicate in the test protocol the allowable batch volumes, the list of military units, and the supply contract number.
Instead, the SRO, which settles payments with suppliers, lacks information about the batch volumes and pays based on documents from product officers. That is, there is no verification between the volume allowed for delivery and what is actually supplied to the Armed Forces and paid by the SRO. In other words, a supplier company can obtain FSVMD authorization for the supply of 10,000 cans but actually deliver and receive payment for 100,000 cans to the troops.
In contrast, the SRO pays suppliers for foodstuffs based on product acceptance acts and delivery notes. In the acts, the number of food kits delivered by the contractor to the unit is indicated. Those kits consist of basil, potatoes, canned goods, or all together — as long as it remains within the agreed sum for one kit. In the attachments to the acts with the assortment, products are listed without specifying the manufacturer, brand, production date, or FSVMD test protocol number.
Both Ministry of Defence structures confirmed the assumption of no coordination.
"Currently, SE ’SRO’ does not reconcile the volumes (batches) of canned goods actually delivered to the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the volumes that underwent laboratory testing in FSVMD, and only pays for the volumes of products actually received by military units," says the response from SRO to the journalists’ inquiry.
Meanwhile, FSVMD, as follows from the response from the Ministry of Defence, informs SRO only about rejected batches of products.
Thus, it turns out that the function of controlling the quality of products actually supplied to the Armed Forces is today entirely assigned to the lowest link — product officers of combat units. It seems that they have to control all the paperwork provided by suppliers and verify a mass of information including contract terms, authenticity of test protocols and quality declarations, batch volumes, all for dozens of products delivered simultaneously. Ensuring such control in combat conditions is simply unrealistic.
Author: Yelyzaveta Chyp