The Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently in a critical situation with ammunition and personnel, — UP.
As of today, the monthly expenditure rate of shells for all units located on the line from Kharkiv to Donetsk, which includes dozens of brigades, is equal to the amount that only 10-20 howitzers could fire during the defence of Bakhmut.
A significant amount of ammunition was spent during the Kursk offensive operation. The Kursk group received dozens of times more ammunition than the units defending in Kharkiv and Donetsk.
We are practically not firing now. The entire front is held by drones: it’s with drones that you mine, destroy, and do whatever you want, — the military states.
For the entire battalion per day, I receive only five 120 mm mines, while for effective defence, I should receive 30 mines for just one mortar, — said one of the soldiers.
Most Ukrainian drones coming to the front are not flying — they need to be improved in workshops and personal funds of the soldiers are being invested. Instead of planning strategic, operational actions, Syrskyi is engaged in writing combat instructions for restoring the positions of squads.
The General Staff violates logic, common sense, and regulatory documents by sending coordinates for where to place a squad position. Determining squad positions is at most a task for a platoon commander! Meanwhile, these directives come with a clarification: if you do not determine the position there, you will face criminal liability.
There is a cold working relationship between Syrskyi and Drapatyi, with the commander-in-chief often considering his management decisions as the best and stripping Drapatyi of some of his powers. Syrskyi insists on offensive actions, while Drapatyi believes there are not enough forces to conduct an offensive and suggests transitioning to defence.
Syrskyi still decides where to send 10, 20, 100 people after the training center, who goes to which corps, although this should be handled by the Ground Forces! He deliberately and consciously limits the powers of Drapatyi.
In the worst-case scenario for Ukraine, in the summer, Russia could advance dozens of kilometers and eventually get bogged down in long urban battles — in Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, or Pokrovsk. Or it may attempt to capture villages in Dnipropetrovsk region.