The trap of "Midas": Why suspicions against Halushchenko and Chernyshov may not return 112 million dollars to the state

“There’s nothing terrible about being under suspicion,” former Minister Herman Halushchenko calmly remarked during the consideration of a preventive measure. Why is there logic in these words?

He became the second public figure after Oleksiy Chernyshov to be named in the “Midas case,” not only being declared a suspect but also detained and prevented from leaving the country. The case involves the laundering of over $112 million, obtained from activities in the energy sector during his tenure in leadership positions at “Energoatom” and the government.

However, suspicion and even arrest do not guarantee a swift verdict. Ukrainian experience shows that cases of such magnitude can drag on in courts for years.

One only needs to recall the story of Roman Nasirov, the former head of the State Fiscal Service, accused of illegally deferring tax obligations for companies linked to a “gas scheme,” causing damages of nearly 3 billion UAH. Almost ten years have passed, and if the High Anti-Corruption Court does not consider the appeal by April, Nasirov may escape accountability.

Large corruption cases have another dimension. While society watches court hearings for years, multimillion-dollar assets continue to sustain the suspects. These funds allow them to maintain a luxurious lifestyle, educate their children in Switzerland, and most importantly, pay for expensive lawyers who delay the process by exploiting procedural flaws and help avoid responsibility.

For years, the return of criminal assets was not among the state’s priorities. Over the past 20 years, Ukraine has achieved only one large-scale return of corrupt assets from abroad. Therefore, it is not surprising that Halushchenko, who rented the seized house of fugitive minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko, most likely paid $130 per day to Zakharchenko’s representative.

Without real seizure and confiscation of assets, any “arrests” (in all cases, not just corruption ones) risk remaining merely symbolic episodes without financial consequences for the guilty or the return of stolen funds.

What is known about assets linked to the suspects in the “Midas” case

The scale of the “Midas” case is striking even compared to other high-profile corruption scandals. According to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), all transactions were recorded in a “black ledger” called “Complex,” through which over $112 million passed between 2021 and 2025. Some details of how these funds were distributed are already known.

According to the investigation, over $12.9 million was laundered for Halushchenko through cryptocurrency, Swiss accounts, and cash. Chernyshov received over $1.2 million and nearly 100,000 euros in cash. Together, this accounts for less than 15% of the total amount. Where the rest went remains an unanswered question, at least officially.

These are not all the assets the investigation should focus on. There are hundreds of others acquired by the suspects in this scheme.

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According to media reports, only a portion of their property has been seized. Specifically, under arrest are three apartments in Kyiv and two in Dnipro belonging to Tymur Mindich, as well as two premises and two apartments in central Kyiv owned by Oleksandr Tsukerman. Additionally, during a search of Ihor Fursenko’s property, authorities seized over 1 million euros and over 1 million dollars in cash.

During the implementation of schemes at “Energoatom,” the suspects and their close associates amassed expensive cars and real estate. In Ukraine alone, the suspects and related persons possess significant wealth.

Is it realistic to recover criminal assets?

The majority of the withdrawn funds are located in foreign jurisdictions. Regarding their return, there are two pieces of news: bad and slightly better.

The bad news is that recovering hidden assets abroad is difficult. Everything depends on three factors: international agreements between countries, political will, and the efficiency of Ukrainian authorities. The specific country involved in the cooperation also matters.

To hide most of the assets, offshore structures were used, including an investment fund on the island of Anguilla, companies in the Marshall Islands, and a trust registered in Saint Kitts and Nevis.

The Marshall Islands, where the “investor” companies were registered, still have issues with corporate ownership transparency. With this jurisdiction, Ukraine has only managed to progress to the stage of securing property before recovery—through court seizures and bans on ships owned by companies registered in these islands from leaving Ukrainian ports. The process has not yet reached the return of funds.

Anguilla, where the investment fund was created, has mechanisms for cooperation, but responses to requests take a long time, and the information provided is often limited. Local law allows funds and trusts to be structured in a way that protects their assets from foreign court decisions. There have been no recorded cases of asset recovery from there so far.

Saint Kitts and Nevis, where the “main trust” of the scheme is registered, also positions itself as a “safe offshore.” Data on company owners is not public, complicating investigations. Although legislation on asset recovery was strengthened in 2019 and updated in 2024, no successful recovery cases have been recorded yet.

However, some of the funds were withdrawn in dollars, which suggests a potential connection to the U.S. financial system.

American authorities have one of the strictest mechanisms in the world for controlling money laundering and can prosecute such crimes even if they occurred outside the country but involved dollar transactions. Therefore, U.S. support could be key to tracking the movement of funds and increasing the chances of their return in the “Midas” case.

Yet, there is also good news. Switzerland, where part of the funds was transferred to accounts of Halushchenko’s family, is considered a leader in the return of illicit assets. By February 2026, it has returned over $2 billion to various countries.

Swiss legislation allows for the freezing and confiscation of assets not only of foreign officials but also of their close relatives if they formally own or actually control illicit funds.

Ukraine and Switzerland have a legal framework for cooperation. This allows the Ukrainian side to obtain information about assets in Swiss banks and officially request legal assistance.

Even without special agreements, Switzerland is generally open to cooperation. It enters into individual agreements with countries, clearly outlining the conditions for transferring funds and controlling their use.

Asset transfer is possible at any stage of the proceedings if the requesting state has a final decision on their return. However, this does not always work. For example, several million from the Swiss accounts of the wife of “Yanukovych’s forester” have still not been returned to Ukraine due to delays in the decision of the Ukrainian cassation court. The faster a Ukrainian court makes a decision, the sooner Switzerland returns the funds.

Ukraine lacks tools for asset confiscation until a final court decision is made in a criminal case. This process can take decades.

Houses, apartments, cars, and companies located in Ukraine and owned by the suspects in the case also cannot be seized until a final verdict is reached, as the country lacks an effective recovery mechanism.

Civil confiscation of unjustified assets, which does not require a criminal conviction, applies only to civil servants defined by law. Most of the suspects in the “Midas” case do not fall under this category.

As experience shows, confiscation in criminal proceedings is a path that can drag on for years or not happen at all due to case closures, statute of limitations expiring, or other procedural diversions.

What can help?

The U.S., the UK, and EU countries have realized that allowing suspects in organized crime to retain their money until a final court verdict is unwise. During this time, assets disappear, are rewritten, fragmented, or moved abroad, leaving society with empty verdicts and no money.

Confiscation without a conviction is not exotic to Ukrainian law.

First, a mechanism for civil confiscation of unjustified assets of civil servants has been in place for several years.

Second, since 2022, a sanctions-based asset recovery mechanism through the High Anti-Corruption Court has been in effect. It applies to individuals supporting aggression against Ukraine. This involves confiscating blocked assets without a traditional criminal conviction.

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However, in the “Midas” case, this mechanism also does not apply. Although in November 2025, sanctions were imposed on Mindich and Tsukerman, they only block assets. To seize them, a connection to supporting aggression must be proven, and the suspects in the case do not openly demonstrate this.

The paradox is that the experience and legal mechanisms for asset confiscation without a court verdict exist, but they do not apply to one of the most high-profile corruption cases in recent years.

What to do?

Ukraine must create real confiscation tools that can be applied even before a final court verdict (if there are no legal sources for the origin of the suspect’s assets or those connected to the activities of a criminal organization).

Motivation for parliament to adopt such changes could be added by the fact that this is a direct obligation of Ukraine, enshrined in the roadmap on the rule of law.

However, for now, the assets acquired by the suspects in the “Midas” case will likely remain under arrest for a long time instead of working for the benefit of the state.

“Midas” may be far from the last corruption scheme of such scale, so the law cannot continue to be friendly to the preservation of illicit wealth.

As long as corrupt individuals do not risk losing their stolen millions, nothing will change. “Midas” is a test of the state’s ability to recover money, not just announce suspicions.

Author: Tetyana Khutor