ISW assesses Russia’s ability to accumulate resources for a new offensive in Ukraine

ISW assesses Russia’s ability to accumulate resources for a new offensive in Ukraine

The Russian military command intends to create a “strategic reserve” of troops to conduct offensive operations in the spring and summer of 2024. However, it does not plan to equip new units and formations with the necessary amount of weapons and equipment due to the current limitations of the defence industrial base (DIB).

This is stated in a report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) on 11 March. They cited the estimates of Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, as they are consistent with their data.

It is noted that the aggressor country plans to equip only the 27th motorized rifle division (ostensibly created on the basis of the existing 21st motorized rifle brigade of the Central Military District) to 87% of the doctrinally required capacity. The volumes of weapons and equipment collection in the second and fourth quarters of 2024 imply that the Russian military command is setting a similar goal for other new formations and units.

According to Mashovets, it is unlikely that Russian troops will be able to achieve this goal before the specified deadline, given that many regiments, brigades and divisions of the Russian Armed Forces currently operating in Ukraine have only about 30% of the required amount of weapons and equipment.

Several Western and Ukrainian military officials and analysts noted that Russian-reported tank production volumes largely reflect refurbished and modern vehicles pulled from storage, rather than new production.

“The Russian OPB is able to withstand the current pace of transactions of the Russian Army, although it is unlikely to be able to fully support a potential offensive operation at the operational or strategic level using the strategic reserve of manpower until 2024,” ISW agreed with these assessments.

Reports that the Russian military is prioritizing the creation of new, under-equipped units are consistent with analysts that Russia is prioritizing quantity of manpower and equipment over quality.

“But we continue to believe that Russia will have the opportunity to expand its security posture and accumulate resources if it maintains the initiative along the entire front during 2024, which will allow it to create conditions for the upcoming offensive operation using a larger reserve of manpower and equipment,” they emphasized at ISW.

Mashovets stated that the Russian military command intends to form the bulk of the 27th motorized rifle division from the newly formed 433rd regiment (reportedly staffed from degraded units of the 21st WMD), the 506th and 589th regiments. The aggressor is forming its 433rd, 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments at the Tokskoye training ground in the Orenburg region of the Russian Federation and Trekhizbensky in the occupied Luhansk region, planning to bring these units into combat readiness by the end of spring or beginning of summer 2020.

“These regiments are likely intended to be quickly deployed to Ukraine to compensate for losses on the front line, and are unlikely to be staffed with high-quality recruits or operate at maximum doctrinal strength,” experts say.

While Russia does not have the ability to staff and equip these units closer to their planned end strength in the near future, military commanders almost certainly have long-term intentions to fully support them and similar units, they said.

Mashovets noted that the command of the occupiers had already been forced to reconsider the formation of a number of units due to the “discrepancy” between the Kremlin’s ambitions and Russia’s real capabilities to deploy its strategic reserves in practice.

Analysts suggest that the Russian Federation is prioritizing short-term gains, such as limited territorial gains, over long-term sustainability and large-scale operationally significant operations at the Ukraine front.

ISW continues to believe that the introduction by the Russian military command of configurations in the structure of the Russian Armed Forces to urgently commit only established and insufficiently equipped units to battle will most likely limit their immediate effectiveness on the battlefield, but will be sufficient to maintain the current tempo of operations.

“The main variable that will likely determine the speed with which such partially resupplied Russian forces can advance this summer is the availability of military equipment to Ukraine, which, for its part, depends largely on the extension of US military assistance,” the analysts concluded. .